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SEMPRA ENERGY INTERNATIONAL V. THE
ARGENTINE REPUBLIC: REAFFIRMING
THE RIGHTS OF FOREIGN INVESTORS
TO THE PROTECTION OF
ICSID ARBITRATION
Daniel A. Krawiec*
ON January 6, 2002, Argentina passed the "Public Emergency Law
of 2002" in response to its ongoing economic crisis.' Because of
this law and its effects on foreign investors, 2 Argentina has faced
a multiplicity of claims 3 against it in the International Centre for Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes4 ("ICSID"). One such claim was filed by
Sempra Energy International ("Sempra"). 5 Consistently, Argentina has
objected to ICSID jurisdiction to hear claims against it. The ICSID has
consistently rejected these objections and found that it has jurisdiction to
hear the claims. 6 On May 11, 2005, an arbitral tribunal organized under
the auspices of ICSID issued an order rejecting Argentina's objections to
its jurisdiction to hear claims against it by Sempra.7 This note explores
Argentina's main objections to jurisdiction in Sempra's case against it,
explains why the tribunal's determinations in this case are consistent with
ICSID precedent and the text and intent of the U.S.-Argentina bilateral
investment treaty (BIT),8 and suggests that these jurisdictional holdings
are an important reaffirmation of the rights of foreign investors to the
*J.D. 2008, University of Miami School of Law; B.A., 2005, University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor.
1. Paolo Di Rosa, The Recent Wave of Arbitrations Against Argentina Under Bilateral
Investment Treaties: Background and Principal Legal Issues, 36 U. MIAMI INTER-
AM. L. REV. 41, 47 (2004).
2. See id. at 61 and accompanying text (arguing that the Emergency Law and related
measures adversely affected foreign investments in Argentina).
3. See discussion infra Part III.C.
4. See generally Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between
States and Nationals of Other Parties, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S.
159 (hereinafter Convention).
5. Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16 (2005)
(decision on objections to jurisdiction) [hereinafter Sempra I]; Sempra Energy
Int'l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16 (2007) (award of the tri-
bunal) [hereinafter Sempra II]
6. See Di Rosa, supra note 1, at 51.
7. See Sempra Energy Int'l, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, at 44.
8. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment,
U.S.-Arg., Nov. 14, 1991, 31 I.L.M 124 (hereinafter U.S.-Argentina BIT).
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protection of ICSID arbitration under the U.S.-Argentina BIT. Further-
more, this note will also explain that the tribunal's later decision on the
merits provides American investors with substantial substantive protec-
tion under the U.S.-Argentina BIT. A basic understanding of recent Ar-
gentine experience, the recent prominence of BITs in international
relations, and the ICSID itself, however, will be explained first to put the
Sempra case in its proper context.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY AND CURRENT STATUS OF
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES
A. THE ORIGINS OF BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES
AND THEIR PROTECTIONS
The first BIT was signed by Germany and Pakistan on November 25,
1959. 9 Since that initial BIT was signed nearly fifty years ago, BITs pro-
liferated rapidly across the globe, including over 800 since 1987 alone.' 0
These treaties typically offer investors from each signatory nation an ex-
tensive set of substantive protections for their investments within the bor-
ders of the other signatory nation, with the hope of increasing bilateral
foreign direct investment between the two nations."1 BITs also often in-
clude procedural mechanisms for investors to enforce their substantive
rights. One such mechanism is arbitration under the rules of organiza-
tions like ICSID or the International Chamber of Commerce. 12 Cur-
rently, international investors from a variety of nations are protected by
the approximately 2,000 BITs in force in the world today. 13
B. THE LATIN AMERICAN BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATY EXPERIENCE
Before the advent of the modern BIT, a foreign investor's rights in
Latin America were limited by the Calvo Doctrine, which is named after
9. Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, http://worldbank.org/icsid/treaties/i-1.
htm (follow "Search Listings of Bilateral Investment Treaties" under "Publica-
tions"; then follow "Germany" hyperlink).
10. Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, supra note 9.
11. See Susan D. Franck, The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights Under Invest-
ment Treaties: Do Investment Treaties Have A Bright Future, 12 U.C. DAVIS J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 47, 53 (2005). Commonly, these protections consist of "appropri-
ate compensation for expropriation, freedom from unreasonable or discriminatory
measures, guarantees of national treatment, assurances of fair and equitable treat-
ment of investments, promises that investments will receive full protection and
security as well as treatment no less favorable than that accorded under interna-
tional law, and a Sovereign's commitment to honor its obligations [sic]." Id.; See
also Di Rosa, supra note 1, at 41.
12. See Franck, supra note 11, at 54; see also Di Rosa, supra note 1, at 42 (adding that
as of 2005 over 140 were party to the ICSID convention).
13. Third World Network, WTO Symposium Debates Investment Issue (June 17,
2003), available at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/twninfo29.htm (last visited Oct.
9, 2006).
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Argentine statesman Carlos Calvo.14 The Calvo Doctrine gave foreigners
seeking redress after an investment dispute with their host nation only
the rights and access to local courts that citizens of that Latin American
nation also possessed. 15 Needless to say, this meant that access to neutral
international arbitration was generally unavailable to foreign investors. 16
The current state of affairs in Latin America, on paper at least, paints a
much friendlier picture for foreign investors.' 7 Beginning in the 1990s,
many Latin American nations started to increase the number and scope
of their BIT obligations dramatically.' 8 This increase was consistent with
the greater worldwide proliferation of BITs19 also occurring at this time20
due to the increasing worldwide trend toward market economies. 21 As of
August 2002, Latin American nations had signed 219 BITs,22 with Argen-
tina itself accounting for 38 of these.23 Many of these BITs provide for-
eign investors with the right to arbitrate their grievances with one of
several international bodies. 24 The United States-Argentina BIT is one
such treaty.25
C. THE UNITED STATES-ARGENTINA BIT
On November 14, 1991, the United States and Argentina entered into a
BIT, which came into force on October 20, 1994.26 The United States
signed this treaty with the intent of eliminating the harm caused to Amer-
14. Bernardo M. Cremades, Disputes Arising Out Of Foreign Direct Investment in
Latin America: A New Look at the Calvo Doctrine and Other Jurisdictional Issues,
59-JUL Disp. RESOL. J. 78, 80 (2003).
15. Id.
16. See id. at 79-80. Though the Calvo Doctrine's influence has waned at present, early
BITs entered into by Latin American nations sometimes contained Calvo clauses,
and some countries, such as Brazil, still do not necessarily grant foreign investors
the right to international arbitration of their investment disputes. See id. at 80.
17. But see Franck, supra note 11, at 56 (stating that despite the rise of international
arbitration foreign investors face increasing transaction costs, inconsistent arbitra-
tion results, and a generally "unpredictable situation.").
18. See Raidl Emilio Vinuesa, Bilateral Investment Treaties and the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes Under ICSID: The Latin American Experience, 8 L. & Bus. REV.
AM. 501, 505 (2002).
19. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text (showing that BITs are a modern de-
velopment in international relations that have multiplied in number especially dur-
ing the past two decades).
20. During the eight-year period from 1989-96, on average about 103 BITs were
signed each year. Compared to decades past, this was a vast increase. For each
ten-year period prior, starting with the period 1959-68, the same statistic was 6 per
year, 8.1 per year, and 17.7 per year respectively. See Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of
Inv. Disputes, http://worldbank.org/icsid/treaties/i-l.htm (follow "Search Listings
of Bilateral Investment Treaties" under "Publications"; then follow "View Treaties
by Year").
21. See Vinuesa, supra note 19, at 504.
22. Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, supra note 9.
23. Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, supra note 9 (follow "Search Listings of
Bilateral Investment Treaties" under "Publications"; then follow "Argentina").
24. Franck, supra note 11 at 53.
25. U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 8.
26. Practising Law Inst., U.S.-Argentina Bilateral Investment Treaty, 722 PRAC. L.
INST. 1431, 1433 (2005).
314 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 15
ican investors by the Calvo Doctrine, and to provide "important protec-
tions to investors and ... [to create a] more stable and predictable legal
framework for investment. '27 For its part, Argentina signed this treaty
agreeing to offer American investors more protection with the hope of
attracting more private capital with which to stimulate its economic de-
velopment. 28 Importantly, Article I of the treaty defines "investment" in
the following way:
A) "investment" means every kind of investment in the territory of
one Party owned or controlled directly or indirectly by nationals or
companies of the other Party, such as equity, debt, and service and
investment contracts; and includes without limitation:
ii) a company or shares of stock or other interests in a company or
interests in the assets thereof;29
For these investments, the treaty offers several substantive protections.
First, Article IV(1) of the U.S.-Argentina BIT provides investors a right
against expropriation; second, Article II(2)(a) mandates fair and equita-
ble treatment; third, Article II(2)(b) bars arbitrary and discriminatory
treatment; and fourth, Article II(2)(c) contains a general umbrella clause
obligating the host nation to honor its specific arrangement with an inves-
tor.30 To give these investment protections teeth in case of a dispute,31
the U.S.-Argentina BIT allows investors from either nation three dispute
resolution options, 32 the most important of which is recourse to binding
arbitration under a tribunal established by the ICSID.33
27. Id. at 1435 (quoting letter of submittal by the President); See alsoU.S.-Argentina
BIT, supra note 8, art. I(1)(a) (defines in part that under the treaty an investment
"means every kind of investment in the territory of one Party owned or controlled
directly or indirectly by nationals or companies of the other Party, such as equity,
debt, and service and investment contracts").
28. See Practising Law Inst., supra note 27, at 1438.
29. U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 8, art. I(1)(a)(ii).
30. Di Rosa, supra note 1, at 54 (discussing the aforementioned as potential claims in
regards to the multitude of ICSID claims currently outstanding against Argentina).
31. U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 8, art. VII(1)(a)-(c). The U.S.-Argentina BIT de-
fines an investment dispute as "a dispute between a Party and a national or com-
pany of the other Party arising out of or relating to (a) an investment agreement
between that Party and such national or company; (b) an investment authorization
granted by that Party's foreign investment authority ... to such national or com-
pany; or (c) an alleged breach of any right conferred or created by this Treaty with
respect to an investment." Id.
32. U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 8, art. VII(2)(b)-(3)(a)(ii). The other two invest-
ment dispute resolution options offered to investors by the U.S.-Argentina BIT
are access to the host country's local "courts or administrative tribunals" or any
other dispute resolution procedure previously agreed to by the parties. Id.
33. U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 8, art. VII(3)(a)(i)-(ii). It should be noted that
this option is technically only available if the host state is a party to the ICSID
Convention; however, at present time both the United States and Argentina are
parties to the ICSID Convention. See http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontSer-
vlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ContractingStates&ReqFrom=Main
(showing that the United States entered into the ICSID Convention on October
14, 1966 and Argentina on November 18, 1994).
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1I. ICSID
A. HISTORY
The ICSID is an "autonomous intergovernmental" organization, which
facilitates the creation and running of arbitral tribunals to settle invest-
ment disputes between certain sovereign nations and international inves-
tors.34 ICSID was founded on October 14, 1966, when the Convention of
the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
Other States (hereinafter the "Convention") was ratified by twenty coun-
tries. 35 The number of cases handled by ICSID has grown dramatically in
recent years, a phenomenon attributable to the rapid increase in foreign
direct investment flows -from about $25 billion in 1990 to about $200
billion by 1999 36-and the inevitable investment disputes these flows cre-
ate. A large percentage of ICSID claims currently pending are against
Argentina, and these claims came about due to some of this increase in
foreign direct investment.37
B. ICSID JURISDICTIONAL BASES
Ratification of the ICSID Convention itself imposes no obligation on
contracting states to submit to ICSID arbitration. 38 Rather, a contracting
state must accept in writing that for a particular dispute or class of dis-
putes it consents to ICSID jurisdiction. Alternatively, a contracting state
may give its consent in advance,39 such as the United States and Argen-
tina did in their BIT.40 Most ICSID arbitration cases are initiated based
upon such BIT jurisdiction clauses. 41 The ICSID's jurisdiction is limited,
so the fact that a state has consented to ICSID jurisdiction does not mean
that it may always be sued in an ISCID tribunal.42 ICSID jurisdiction is
limited to disputes falling under article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention,
which reads,
The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute aris-
ing directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or
any constituent subdivisions or agency of a Contracting State desig-
nated to the Centre by that State) and a national of another Con-
tracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to
submit to the Centre. When the parties have given their consent, no
34. Roberto Dafiino, A Forum for the Resolution of International Legal Disputes
Through Arbitration and Conciliation 2 (Nov. 16, 2005), http://siteresources.world
bank.org/INTLAWJUSTICE/214576-1139604306966/20817156/ParisICSID.pdf.
35. See Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, Annual Report 2006 12-15, 50 (2006).
ICSID's membership as of the 2006 annual meeting was 143 contracting states. Id.
at 3.
36. Dafiino, supra note 35, at 6.
37. See Di Rosa, supra note 1, at 42.
38. Dafiino, supra note 35, at 5.
39. Id.
40. See U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 8 and accompanying text.
41. See Vinuesa, supra note 19, at 502.
42. Id. at 503 ("[C]onsent of the investor is assumed when the option is expressed on
the request for ICSID arbitration.").
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party may withdraw its consent unilaterally. 43
Consequently, in the case of a BIT based claim, an ICSID tribunal will
look to ensure that consent to jurisdiction is found in the treaty, and that
a legal dispute arising out of an investment between a contracting state
and a national of another state exists. 44
A "national of another contracting state" is defined in two ways by the
Convention. The first is "any natural person who had the nationality of a
Contracting State other than the State party to the dispute." 45 The
second:
[is] any juridical person which had the nationality of a Contracting
State other than the State party to the dispute... and any juridical
person which had the nationality of the Contracting State party to
the dispute on that date and which, because of foreign control, the
parties have agreed should be treated as a national of another Con-
tracting State for the purposes of this Convention.46
On its face, this section states that not only can corporations of a differ-
ent nationality from the contracting state party with which it has a dispute
invoke ICSID jurisdiction, but in some measure so too can a corporation
with the nationality of the contracting state party.47 It is this section that
was at the heart of the jurisdictional dispute in Sempra Energy Int'l. v.
Arg. In turn, the dispute in itself can be traced back to recent Argentine
history and governmental practice.
III. BRIEF HISTORY OF ARGENTINA'S ECONOMIC
AND POLITICAL UPHEAVAL
A. HISTORY OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INSTABILITY
Argentina declared independence from its Spanish colonial rulers in
1816, but due to lingering colonial influence Argentina has always pre-
ferred strong leaders with a penchant for authoritarian practices. 48 His-
torically, this has meant that many of Argentina's leaders have expressed
an indifference to the rule of law. 49 Argentina's elected government was
first overthrown by military coup in 1930, and thereafter the nation began
a long period of economic and political distress that continues today.50 In
43. Convention, supra note 4, ch. II, art. 25(1).
44. See Di Rosa, supra note 1, at 50.
45. See Convention, supra note 4, ch. II, art. 25(2)(a).
46. Id. ch. II, art. 25(2)(b).
47. See Sempra I, supra note 5.
48. See Becky L. Jacobs, Pesification and Economic Crisis in Argentina: The Moral
Hazard Posed by a Politicized Supreme Court, 34 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV.
391, 396-97 (2003); see also Keith S. Rosenn, The Success of Constitutionalism in
the United States and Its Failure in Latin America: An Explanation, 22 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 25 (1990) ("[I]n the Latin American colonies, patrimonial-
ism produced widespread corruption, an incredible penchant for bureaucratic red
tape, and a highly unpredictable and personal legal system.").
49. See Jacobs, supra note 49, at 397.
50. Id. at 397-98.
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the midst of one of its darkest hours, however, newly elected Argentine
President Carlos Menem began to institute seemingly successful eco-
nomic reforms and, for brief period of time, the future appeared bright
for Argentina.5'
At the time of Menem's election, Argentina's largest economic woes
included hyperinflation, a large number of costly, inefficient state-owned
enterprises, and currency exchange problems.5 2 Menem's government
undertook two main reforms to attack these and other problems: the
"Convertibility Law" and the privatization of many of its state owned
enterprises. 53 The Convertibility Law set a fixed exchange rate of one
Argentine peso to one U.S. dollar, and was primarily responsible for cur-
ing Argentina's inflation ills.5 4 Argentina's privatization effort was aimed
at attracting foreign investment because the government believed that
domestic private sector lacked the needed financial resources and techni-
cal knowledge. 55
Using a combination of measures such as the reduction of restrictions
on foreign investment, the signing of BITs with other nations, and the
help of American investment banking firms, 56 Argentina began to priva-
tize many sectors, including its energy sector.5 7 The reforms in the en-
ergy sector were designed to guarantee a profit, but the value of foreign
investors' holdings was still intimately tied to the Argentine government's
continuing political discretion. 58 The energy companies owned by these
investors lacked even the ability to set their own rates, which were tied to
a politically controlled currency exchange rate.59 Ultimately, these con-
trols and the government's ability to alter its policies governing these con-
trols would lead to the claims of Sempra and other foreign energy
investors against Argentina.60
B. EMERGENCY MEASURES
Despite the initial success of Argentina's reform program,61 the 1990s
eventually brought severe recession to Argentina.62 Argentina was una-
51. Id. at 398-99. In fact, "Argentina's economy was so strong that the International
Monetary Fund and other financial institutions were holding the country up as a
model for the rest of South America to follow." Larry Luxner, Ambassador of
Argentina Diego Guelar: Overcoming the Crisis, THE WASHINGTON DIPLOMAI,
http://www.washdiplomat.com/02-04/a802 04.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2006).
52. Di Rosa, supra note 1, at 44.
53. See id.
54. Jacobs, supra note 49, at 398-99.
55. Di Rosa, supra note 1, at 44-45.
56. Id. at 45.
57. See Sempra I, supra note 5, $91 18-19.
58. Di Rosa, supra note 1, at 45-46.
59. Id.
60. See Sempra I, supra note 5, 9 18-19.
61. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (arguing that initially Argentina's re-
forms were successful).
62. Jacobs, supra note 49, at 399.
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ble to control its public spending at this time, and fell deeply into debt.63
Furthermore, Argentine industry became less competitive as the U.S.
dollar, to which its currency was pegged, rose in value. 64 One of the final
straws that broke Argentina's back was the spread of the 1998-99 Asian
financial crisis to Latin America. 65 Shortly afterwards, the International
Monetary Fund ("IMF") refused to allow Argentina to borrow any addi-
tional money to finance its massive budget deficits. 66 As a consequence
of this IMF decision, Argentina's President announced that Argentina
would enter "into the largest sovereign default in history. '67 Cumula-
tively, these events and others prompted the Argentine government to
pass the Public Emergency Law of 2002 ("Emergency Law"). 68
The Emergency Law affected foreign investments in the energy indus-
try greatly. 69 Foremost among the damaging legal changes for foreign
investors under the Emergency Law was the Emergency Law's "pessifica-
tion" of utility rates.70 Under their original concession contracts, Argen-
tine utility companies owned by foreign investors were allowed to
calculate their utility rates in dollars, but then had to convert the figure
into pesos at an even exchange when billing customers. 71 As long as it
was still possible for the utility companies to convert their revenue back
into dollars later at the same one peso for one dollar rate, the utility com-
panies were profitable and could both finance their operations and con-
tinue to invest in needed infrastructure. 72  The Emergency law
"pessified" utility revenues, by mandating that utility rates continue to be
calculated in dollars and converted to pesos under the one-to-one conver-
sion rate, but at the same time the law eliminated the government's one-
to-one convertibility guarantee and let the peso's value float on the open
market. 73
The value of the floating peso would fall as low as a four-to-one ratio
against the U.S. dollar.74 By comparison, today the exchange rate has
recovered somewhat, but still stands at approximately 3.1 pesos to the
dollar. 75 This measure alone cut utility company incomes by two-thirds. 76
The Emergency Law, however, went even a step further than this. It
froze utility rates at their then-current level and, "ordered these compa-
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.; see also Di Rosa, supra note 1, at 46.
66. Jacobs, supra note 49, at 400.
67. Id.
68. Di Rosa, supra note 1, at 47; see generally Argentine Law No. 25561, Jan. 6, 2002,
[LXII-A] A.D.L.A. 44.
69. See Di Rosa, supra notel, at 47.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See Di Rosa, supra note 1, at 48.
73. See id.
74. Id.
75. Yahoo Finance, http://finance.yahoo.com/currency/convert?amt=l&from=USD&
to=ARS&submit=Convert (last visited Oct. 11, 2006).
76. Di Rosa, supra note 1, at 48.
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nies to continue fully to abide by their obligations under their respective
concession contracts, and authorized the executive branch to renegotiate
the public utility concession contracts. 77 Faced with these damaging
changes to the profitability of their investments in Argentina and the pas-
sage of several years with no relief, a great many foreign investors have
decided to try to obtain relief in ICSID arbitration.78
C. RECENT WAVE OF ICSID CLAIMS AGAINST ARGENTINA
As of this writing thirty-three of the 105 pending claims, or about 31.4
percent, at ICSID were against Argentina.79 While as recently as 2005
the percentage of pending ICSID claims against Argentina was even
higher,80 claims relating to Argentina still account for a vastly dispropor-
tionate amount of pending ICSID claims. 81 Currently the state is facing
the second highest amount of ICSID claims, while Ecuador and Mexico
face only six each. 82 The vast majority of these claims against Argentina,
including Sempra Energy's, can be attributed to the effects of the "emer-
gency measures" Argentina implemented in response to its 2001-02 eco-
nomic crisis.83
IV. SEMPRA V. ARGENTINE REPUBLIC DISCUSSED
A. SEMPRA ENERGY AND ITS CLAIMS
Sempra Energy International is a large, Fortune 500, San Diego, Cali-
fornia, based energy company that serves over 29 million utility custom-
ers in North America, Asia, and South America. 84 In the midst of
Argentine President Menem's large-scale privatization plan, Sempra pur-
chased a 43.09 percent share in the Argentine companies Sodigas Sur
S.A. ("Sodigas Sur") and Sodigas Pampeana S.A. ("Sodigas Pampe-
ana").85 The other shareholder in these two companies is Camuzzi Inter-
77. Id.
78. See id. at 49.
79. Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, http://worldbank.org/icsid/cases/pending.
htm (follow "List of Cases" under "Cases")
80. See Di Rosa, supra note 1, at 43 n.9 (stating that as of Feb. 28, 2005 41.2% of the
pending ICSID cases were against Argentina); see also discussion supra Part III.B
(explaining the events which lead to the passage of Argentina's Emergency Law
and how the law affected foreign investments in Argentina negatively).
81. Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, supra note 82.
82. Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, supra note 82. Even more telling is that
out of a total of forty-one states facing such claims, only thirteen other states face
more than one claim and only eight other states face three or more claims.
83. Di Rosa, supra note 1, at 42.
84. Sempra Energy, http://www.sempra.com/aboutUs/about.htm (last visited Nov. 12,
2006 ) [hereinafter Sempra Websitel.
85. Camuzzi Int'l v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/2, at 2 (Decision on Objections to
Jurisdiction of May 11, 2005). Camuzzi requested, and the tribunal granted, that
both Sempra's claims and Camuzzi's claims be heard and decided by a single IC-
SID tribunal. Argentina issued nearly identical objections to jurisdiction in
Camuzzi's case, and in response the tribunal issued an opinion rejecting Argen-
tina's objections, which was nearly identical to the opinion which it issued in Sem-
pra's case. See id.
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national S.A. ("Camuzzi"), a Luxembourg based corporation, which
owned 56.91 percent in both Sodigas Sur and Sodigas Pampeana.8 6 "The
latter two Argentine companies, in turn, hold 90 percent and 86.09 per-
cent, respectively, of the shares in Camuzzi Gas del Sur S.A. ("CGS")
and Camuzzi Gas Pampeana S.A. ("CGP"), each of which, in its capacity
as "Licensee" is a natural gas distribution company. '87
On September 11, 2002, Sempra filed a request for ICSID arbitration
under the U.S.-Argentine BIT, alleging that Argentina had modified its
regulatory framework in a way that "severely [and adversely] affects
Sempra's investment in [these] two natural gas distribution companies" in
violation "of the guarantees granted by the Argentine Republic pursuant
to law and the licenses,"'88 and consequently, the BIT.89 Specifically,
Sempra complained that these regulatory changes violated the U.S.-Ar-
gentina BIT because such changes amounted to expropriation, a denial of
fair and equitable treatment, violation of the treaty's umbrella clause, ar-
bitrary and discriminatory treatment, and failure to give full protection
and security,90 and that this cost the company $209.3 million.91
Argentina, however, presented several jurisdictional objections to Sem-
pra's ability to bring its claims to ICSID. 92 Pursuant to ICSID procedural
rules and the Convention, 93 the tribunal suspended determination of the
merits to consider Argentina's objections. 94
B. ARGENTINA'S OBJECTIONS TO JURISDICTION
1. Nationality and Control
"The Argentine Republic puts forward as an objection to jurisdiction,
first, that Sempra does not meet the nationality requirement established
in Article 25(2)(b) of the Convention because, in its capacity as minority
86. See Sempra I, supra note 5, 19; see also Camuzzi Int'l, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/
2, at 4.
87. Sempra I, supra note 5, 19.
88. Id. at $T 1 & 20.
89. Id.
90. See generally Sempra II, supra note 5, 9 270-324.
91. Id., 91 198; see also supra notes 63-71 and accompanying text.
92. See Sempra Energy Int'l, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, at 5, $9 21-28. Though
Argentina pleaded six specific objections against jurisdiction, this note will focus
only on three of these objections. Id. The other three objections, that "the claim is
not mature since the matter is still subject to a renegotiation," "that Sempra has
not established or proven its condition of investor with the pertinent corporate
documents," and Sempra is "prevented from taking action in this [ICSID] forum
as a result of the forum selection clause[s] of [Sodigas Sur and Sodigas Pampe-
ana's] license[s]," will not be discussed as they are either baseless or mooted by the
tribunal's resolution of the other objections. Id.
93. See Convention, supra note 4, ch. IV, §3, art. 41(2); see also ICSID Rules of Proce-
dure for Arbitration Proceedings, R. 41(3) (2003), http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/
basicdoc/partF-chap05.htm#r41.
94. See Sempra I, supra note 5, $1 13; see also Di Rosa, supra note 1, at 50-51 ("In an
ICSID arbitration, the Tribunal must suspend the merits phase of a case if jurisdic-
tional objections are raised. The Tribunal can only resume the merits phase if it
decides that jurisdiction properly exists, or if it determines that it must also hear
the merits of the dispute to decide the issue of jurisdiction.")
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shareholder in the companies participating in CGS and CGP, it cannot
substitute itself in the latter's rights."'95
The premise of Argentina's first objection is simple. 96 Article 25(1)
only allows a "national of another contracting state" to invoke ICSID
jurisdiction. 97 In turn, Article 25(2)(b) defines "national of another Con-
tracting State," to mean either a company that is actually a citizen of an-
other nation that has signed the ICSID Convention or a company that,
while actually a citizen of the nation defending the ICSID claim, will per
agreement98 be considered a citizen of another nation for the limited pur-
pose of establishing ICSID jurisdiction. The ICSID tribunal in the pre-
sent case refers to these options as those of the first and "second
sentence[s] of Article 25(2)(b) of the Convention," respectively.99
Argentina argued that in a situation such as this, where the investment
itself was really an Argentine corporation, ICSID jurisdiction must be
invoked under the second sentence; otherwise the first sentence would be
merely redundant. 100 Argentina then argued that because, in its analysis,
Sempra did not maintain "exclusive control"''1 1 over either CGP or CGS,
Sempra, acting in the guise of either CGP or CGS, could not invoke juris-
diction under the second sentence either. 10 2 Consequently, Argentina ar-
gued that without a claimant that qualifies as a "national of another
Contracting State,"'1 3 the tribunal did not have the required article 25(1)
jurisdiction. 10 4 The tribunal flatly rejected Argentina's objection and
declared: 0 5
[T]he option offered by the second sentence of Article 25(2)(b) of
the Convention, as well as by Article VII(8) of the Treaty, provides
an additional or different alternative which does not in this case pre-
vent an investor from opting to act under the first sentence of the
Convention article if it meets the pertinent requirements. 10 6
Simply put, the tribunal rejected the exclusivity of the two options, and
declared that Sempra was free to claim "as a national of the United
States, the other contracting State, insofar as it meets the requirements
laid down in the Convention and the Treaty."'1 7 The U.S.-Argentina
BIT, in pertinent part, says that a company "shall be treated as a national
or company of such other Party in accordance with Article 25(2)(b) of the
95. Sempra I, supra note 5, $ 29.
96. See id. $$ 29-58.
97. See Di Rosa, supra note 1, at 50.
98. Convention, supra note 4, ch. II, art. 25(2)(b).
99. Sempra I, supra note 5, $ 44.
100. Id.
101. Id. 30. Argentina maintained that "exclusive control" meant that a shareholder
need not only be dominant, but must be capable of "blocking changes in the com-
pany." Id.
102. Id. 29-30.
103. Convention, supra note 4, ch. I, art. 25(2)(b).
104. Sempra I, supra note 5, T 22.
105. See id. 45.
106. Id.
107. See id. 42.
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ICSID Convention."'' 0 8 Implicit in the tribunal's reasoning was that, "as
a national of the United States,"' 1 9 Sempra by definition meets the re-
quirements110 of the first sentence of article 25(2)(b). 11 Consequently,
under the tribunal's reasoning it had jurisdiction to hear Sempra's claims
despite Argentina's first objection. 11 2
2. Indirect Losses
The second objection to jurisdiction presented by the Argentine Re-
public is that the Claimant could only validly claim if it could prove
that a legal right that it possessed in its capacity as shareholder had
been violated, causing it a direct loss. If it were a matter of a mere
interest affected as a result of a measure that affects the company in
which it is a shareholder, it is then the company that is entitled to
claim and not the shareholder. 113
Essentially, Argentina claimed that Sempra's claim is not a legal dis-
pute and that in any case, even if it were a legal dispute, Sempra's
claimed loss does not arise directly from its investment.11 4
The tribunal again rejected Argentina's objection. 1 5 First, the tribunal
held that "[t]he actual claim submitted ... arises from alleged violation of
the rights and guarantees that the investor has in the light of the Treaty.
108. U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 8, art. VII(8). In its entirety, article VII(8) of the
BIT reads: "For purposes of an arbitration held under paragraph 3 of this Article,
any company legally constituted under the applicable laws and regulations of a
Party or a political subdivision thereof but that, immediately before the occurrence
of the event or events giving rise to the dispute, was an investment of nationals or
companies of the other Party, shall be treated as a national or company of such
other Party in accordance with Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention." Id.
109. Sempra I, supra note 5, 42; see also Sempra Website, supra note 87.
110. See discussion supra Part. II.B (explaining the requirements of Article 25(2)(b) of
the ICSID Convention).
111. See Sempra I, supra note 5, 45.
112. While the tribunal ruled that Sempra had legitimately invoked its jurisdiction
under the first sentence of Article 25(2)(b) of the Convention, it chose to also
opine on the hypothetical situation in which Sempra chooses to invoke its jurisdic-
tion under the second sentence, on the basis that it controlled CGS and CGP.
Sempra I, supra note 5, 9 46. Ultimately, the tribunal concluded that had Sempra
chose to go the route of the second sentence, it would have had the requisite con-
trol of CGS and CGP through its shareholders agreement with Cammuzi. See id. $
56. Taking into account the complications arising from the fact that both Sempra
and Camuzzi claim different nationalities, the tribunal noted that "if the context of
the initial investment or other subsequent acquisitions results in a certain foreign
investors operating jointly, it is then presumable that their participation has been
viewed as a whole [by the host nation], even though they are of different nationali-
ties and are protected by different treaties. In such a case, it would be perfectly
feasible [and satisfy ICSID jurisdictional requirements] for these participations to
be combined for purposes of control or to make the whole the beneficiary." Id.
54. The tribunal, however, stressed that in this situation a claimant would have to
demonstrate that "joint participation was actually the case," and among other fac-
tors, in this case highlighted the fact that a department of the Argentine govern-
ment had approved Sempra and Camuzzi's arrangement. Id. $1 55.
113. Id. $1 59.
114. See id.
115. Id. $$ 77-79.
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[Consequently,] [t]he legal nature of this dispute is beyond any doubt."' "16
Argentina attempted the argument' 1 7 that in fact its actions had harmed,
if at all, only the licenses possessed by CGS and CGP, 118 which did not
create a required cause of action under Argentine law for sharehold-
ers. 19 Instead, the tribunal accepted Sempra's assertion that a legal dis-
pute is created merely because Sempra's claim "refers to a violation of
the obligations contained in the Treaty and the corresponding compensa-
tion... [because] the existence of such obligations arises directly from the
Treaty and is independent of the fact that the right of the licensees may
also have been violated."' 20 Thus, regardless of the merits of Sempra's
claim, it is legal in nature as soon as the U.S.-Argentina BIT's legal obli-
gations are invoked. 12'
Second, the tribunal concluded that as alleged "the [legal] dispute
arises directly from the investment that the Claimant has made in the
companies incorporated in the Argentine Republic for the purpose of
channeling the investment to the licensees."' 22 Here the tribunal again
based its decision on the BIT. 123 According to the tribunal, the way in
which the BIT defines "investment" 124 and the BIT's underlying pur-
poses would be frustrated if it were to find otherwise. 125 In other words,
the BIT broadly defines what constitutes an investment and offers broad
protection for these investments. 126 Because "the investment was made
to carry out the specific economic activity involved in the privatization
project, in addition to the fact that in doing so contracts leading to the
issuance of a license were signed with the State", there is a sufficiently
direct connection between Argentina's alleged breach of its treaty-based
duties and Sempra's alleged losses. 127 Consequently, the tribunal found
that it had jurisdiction to hear Sempra's claim despite Argentina's second
116. Sempra I, supra note 5, 68.
117. This argument and the facts upon which it is based also have significance as to the
issue of whether Sempra's claimed loss arises directly enough from its investment.
See id.
118. See id. [ 60.
119. See id.
120. Id. 64.
121. See id. 70-71.
122. Id. 69. Argentina tried to draw a distinction between general measures, such as
regulatory change, and specific violations of specific contracts. Id. 71. While
agreeing that Argentina retained certain sovereign prerogatives, the tribunal found
that general measures can still amount to bilateral investment treaty violations.
See id. .
123. See id. 9 70.
124. An "'investment" means every kind of investment in the territory of one Party
owned or controlled directly or indirectly by nationals or companies of the other
Party, such as equity, debt, and service and investment contracts; and includes
without limitation ... a company or shares of stock or other interests in a company
or interests in the assets thereof." U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 8, at art. I,
§ 1(a)(ii).
125. The tribunal argued that Argentina "signed [the treaty] with the precise intention
of guaranteeing the investments that would be made in the privatization process
*. ." See Sempra I, supra note 5, 69.
126. See U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 8, at art. I, § 1(a)(ii).
127. See Sempra I, supra note 5, 74.
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objection. 128
3. Lack of jus standi
[Argentina's final argument is] that although companies [CGS and
CGP] qualify as investments under the terms of the Treaty, such
companies must be directly or indirectly owned or else be controlled
by a national or a company having the nationality of the other State
party to the dispute. In the opinion of the Argentine Republic, Sem-
pra does not own or control any national company having links with
the licensees... [Therefore] Sempra cannot argue that is has a genu-
ine claim of its own in the light of the Treaty entitling it to bring an
action before ICSID since, if it suffered harm this is purely of a con-
tractual nature and should therefore be a matter of claim and action
by licensee companies. 129
This was Argentina's final attempt 130 to object to jurisdiction based on
its assertion that "the Tribunal could not hear the claims of investors who
did not control the licensees.' 131 According to Argentina, "the right [to
bring a claim based on CGS and CGP's licenses] belongs to the licensees
under a contract and not to their shareholders [Sempra and Camuzzi]
under international law."' 132 Therefore, the tribunal decided that in order
resolve Argentina's third objection and to determine whether in fact
Sempra has jus standi before the tribunal, the tribunal must determine
two things under international law:1 33 (1) whether the U.S.-Argentina
BIT allows an investor who is not a majority shareholder to bring a claim,
and (2) "whether the cause of action lies in the Treaty, the contract, or
both." 134
If Sempra lacked the right, as a minority shareholder, to bring a claim
to ICSID under the treaty, then the tribunal would lack jurisdiction. 13 5
As to this first question, the tribunal found that under the BIT itself, a
minority shareholder, "whether they control the company or not,"'136 as
well as the majority shareholder, has the right to make a claim.137 The
tribunal rested its decision mainly on previous ICSID tribunal decisions,
128. Id. J 79. Argentina also raised what amounts to a policy concern, "that if the right
of shareholders to claim when only their interests are affected is recognized it
could lead to an unlimited chain of claims". Id. 5[ 77. The tribunal answered quite
logically, quoting the Enron decision, that while Argentina is theoretically correct,
the possibility is simply a manifestation of the extent of Argentina's own consent
to arbitration. Id.; see also Enron Corp. & Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3 (2004) (decision on jurisdiction).
129. Sempra I, supra note 5, 80, 83.
130. See discussion supra Parts IV.1 and 2 (explaining Argentina's first two objections
to jurisdiction, which in some way both relate back to an objection that Sempra
itself lacked control of the violated licensees).
131. Sempra I, supra note 5, 90.
132. Id.
133. Id. f[ 91.
134. Id.
135. See id. 80.
136. Id. $ 93.
137. Id.
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which according to the tribunal support their contention uniformly, 138 but
also added that the word "'investment" was broadly understood in the
BIT and intended to provide enforceable investment protection. 139 Con-
sequently. Sempra did have to the right to bring an ICSID claim under
the BIT.140
As to the second question, the tribunal found that Sempra's "claim
is... founded on both the contract and the Treaty, independently of the
fact that purely contractual questions having no effect on the provisions
of the Treaty can be subject to legal action available under the domestic
law of the Argentine Republic." 141 In finding this, the tribunal noted that
while it is true that the "specific nature of each claim can only be assessed
by examining the merits of the dispute," 142 the dispute at the heart of the
claim itself is how any violation of purely contractual agreements be-
tween CGS and CGP affected Sempra's rights as an investor "in the light
of the provisions of the Treaty and the guarantees on the basis of which it
made the protected investment." 143 Explicit in the tribunal's reasoning
was that a claim can be both contract- and treaty-based, and still support
ICSID jurisdiction where the fact giving rise to the claim is first and fore-
most just a contractual violation. 144 Consequently, according to the tribu-
nal, Sempra did not lack jus standi to bring its claim before ICSID. 145
V. ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION ON JURISDICTION
A. THE JURISDICTIONAL HOLDINGS OF THE TRIBUNAL
At the end of the day, the tribunal's decision in the present case can be
boiled down to three simple ICSID jurisdictional rules. 146 First, the two
options presented by the first and second sentences of Article 25(2)(b) of
the Convention are not mutually exclusive: a claimant may invoke IC-
SID's jurisdiction using either sentence so long as he meets the require-
ments of either sentence. 147 Second, a legal dispute is present where the
alleged harm is done in violation of the BIT, and under the U.S.-Argen-
tina BIT. there was a sufficiently direct connection between Sempra and
the harm by virtue of the fact that Sempra's partial ownership control
over the Argentine companies counts as an investment under the BIT's
138. See id. 94.
139. Id. 93, see also discussion supra, Part I.C (explaining the definition of an invest-
ment under the U.S-Argentina BIT).
140. See Sempra I, supra note 5, 94.
141. Id. 101.
142. Id. 1 100.
143. Id.
144. See id. 11 98-99.
145. See id. 1 101.
146. These rules, in large part, find their support in the U.S.-Argentina BIT, and may
not be generally applicable to claims based on other BITs. See, e.g., id. 93 (utiliz-
ing the U.S.-Argentina BIT and the decisions of previous tribunal decisions con-
cerning such treaty in reaching its final jurisdictional decision).
147. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1 (discussing the tribunal's rejection of Sempra s
argument that the two sentences of Article 25(2)(b) of the Convention were mutu-
ally exclusive).
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broad definition.148 Third, under the U.S.-Argentina BIT, a minority
shareholder can bring a claim, and the ICSID may hear the claim even if
it is based in contract and in treaty. 149 All of these conclusions are consis-
tent with recent ICSID precedent and the U.S.-Argentina BIT. Argen-
tina should accept them once and for all and stop objecting to jurisdiction
on such grounds.
1. The Two Options Presented by the First and Second Sentences of
Article 25(2)(b) of the Convention Are Not Mutually
Exclusive
At first glance, Argentina's argument seems sensible given the circum-
stances. 150 In a case such this, where a claimant contends their invest-
ment is an Argentine corporation that it controls, the second option
might seem redundant. 15 The tribunal's decision to allow Sempra its
choice of whether to claim its status as a "juridical person who ... has the
nationality of a contracting State different from the State that is a party in
the dispute"' 2 makes good sense in light of the purpose of the U.S.-Ar-
gentina BIT and also in light of ICSID precedent interpreting a similar
treaty. 153
As noted above, 154 the purpose of the BIT was to give "important pro-
tections to investors and... [to create a] more stable and predictable legal
framework for investment."1 55 Many investors in the Argentine priva-
tization process, which this treaty was supposed to promote, 56 do not
directly have contracts with the Argentine Government. 157 Rather, they
own only stock, purchased from the Argentina Government, in corpora-
tions set up by the Argentine Government for the specific purpose of
conferring the utility concession contracts. 158 If the ICSID were to force
such foreign investors to satisfy the second sentence and prove control, 159
not only might this frustrate the treaty's purpose of protecting an investor
148. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the tribunal's rejection of Argentina's
second objection to jurisdiction).
149. See discussion supra Part IV.B.3 (discussing the tribunal's rejection of Argentina's
third objection to jurisdiction).
150. See Sempra I, supra note 5, 44.
151. Id..
152. Id. T1 39 (citing the Convention, supra note 4, at art. 25(2)(b).
153. See id. 93.
154. See discussion supra Part I.C (explaining that both the United States' and Argen-
tina's motive for creating a bilateral investment treaty was to better protect inves-
tors and to increase Argentine economic development).
155. U.S.-Argentina BIT, Letter of Submittal, 1991 U.S.T. LEXIS 176, at *4 (1993)
(explaining that both the United States' and Argentina's motive for creating a bi-
lateral investment treaty was to better protect investors and to increase Argentine
economic development)..
156. See id. (noting that although the BIT encourages investment, it does not, by itself,
cause increased U.S. private investment right away).
157. Di Rosa, supra note 1, at 55.
158. Id.
159. See Sempra I, supra note 5, 1 39-41 (demonstrating that in this case, the tribunal
was inclined to find that Sempra likely could also have demonstrated the requisite
control to claim under the second sentence of Article 25(2)(b)).
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who for some reason cannot show this control adequately, but for practi-
cal purposes it would make the first sentence of Article 25(2)(b) a nullity
for the investors who participated in Argentina's privatization process.
By cleverly structuring the terms of its privatization process, Argentina
would have been allowed to rescind the part of its obligation to the
United States regarding the very investors the United States meant to
protect, and Argentina meant to attract, by using the treaty. 160
In any case, without explicitly relying on the US-Argentina BIT's os-
tensible values, the tribunal instead chose to rely explicitly upon a prior
ICSID tribunal decision, Luchetti, which interpreted a similar treaty to
reach its decision. In Lucchetti,161 an ICSID tribunal interpreted Article
VII8(3) of the Peru-Chile BIT, which "envisaged in the pertinent treaty"
that a domestic company controlled by a foreign investor could claim as a
citizen of the other nation, as providing an option between petitioning as
a foreign investor or as a foreign controlled company. 162 The Sempra
tribunal found no reason to reject the spirit of the Lucchetti holding, and
even found that such an interpretation made good sense by allowing in-
vestors the right to pick based on their own unique "corporate arrange-
ments and control structures. ' 163 Given both the treaty purpose
considerations discussed above and also the Lucchetti decision, the tribu-
nal's interpretation of Article 25(2)(b) stands on firm ground.
2. Sempra's Legal Dispute and the BIT's Broad Definition of
Investment Creates a Sufficiently Direct Connection
The tribunal rightly found that "[t]he legal nature of this dispute is be-
yond any doubt. 1 64 The tribunal supported its assertion by pointing out
that Sempra had indeed alleged a violation of its own rights under the
BIT, and that this created a valid legal dispute. 165 Argentina had at-
tempted to re-characterize Sempra's claim as actually being that of CGP
and CGS under their contracts with Argentina. 166 The tribunal correctly
resisted this attempt and read Sempra's allegations for what they actually
said. To do otherwise in this instance would have been to ignore the fact
that Sempra had rights under the BIT, and would frustrate the very pur-
pose of the BIT.167 In order to give the treaty force, a proper allegation
must support jurisdiction. 168
Furthermore, the tribunal also correctly found that this dispute arose
with sufficient directness from Sempra's investment. 169 This finding was
160. See 771 PLI/Lit 9 at 1192.
161. See Lucchetti S.A. v. Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/4 (2005) (award).
162. See Sempra I, supra note 5, 44.
163. Id.
164. Id. T 68.
165. Id.
166. See id. f[ 29.
167. See id. T 69 (explaining the purpose of the U.S.-Argentina BIT as "guaranteeing
the investments that would bemade in the privatization process").
168. See id. 73.
169. See id. T[ 79.
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partly based on the BIT itself, specifically, the BIT's definition of the
word 'investment. 170
The definition provided by the BIT is broad, and the tribunal noted
again that the BIT "was signed with the precise intention of guaranteeing
the investments... by means of the specific modality with which they
were made."' 171 This interpretation is consistent with previous interpreta-
tions of the BIT's definition of investment, such as in the Azurix decision
where the tribunal said, "[t]he objective of the definition of investment in
the BIT is precisely to include this type of structure established for the
exclusive purpose of the investment in order to protect the real party in
interest."'1 72 Consequently, although the tribunal agreed with Argentina
that "setting the value of the currency is a sovereign right,"' 173 the tribunal
found the requisite directness between so-called "measures of a general
nature 1 74 and Argentina's alleged treaty violation. CGS and CGP were
the modalities of Sempra's investment, and therefore when Argentina en-
acts even general measures, which harm CGS and CGP, the treaty may
be directly violated-regardless of whether or not the harm occurred as a
result of an otherwise valid exercise of Argentina's sovereign power. 175
Finally, the tribunal also pointed out that directness has been found in
a similar fashion under the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA): 176
The fact that a host state does not explicitly interfere with share own-
ership is not decisive. The issue is rather whether a breach of the
NAFTA leads with sufficient directness to loss or damage in respect
of a given instrument. Whether GAMI can establish such prejudice
is a matter to be examined on the merits. Uncertainty in this regard
is not an obstacle to jurisdiction. 177
Because the BIT has the purpose of protecting Sempra's exact type of
investment, 178 the tribunal was sound in relying on the GAMI tribunal's
determination that direct does not mean explicit interference "'with share
ownership."'179
170. See U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 8, at art. I, § l(a)(ii).
171. Sempra I. supra note 5. 69.
172. Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12 64 (2003) (de-
cision on jurisdiction).
173. See Sempra, supra note 5. 71.
174. Id. 62.
175. Id. 11 71-79.
176. North American Free Trade Agreement. U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992. 32 I.L.M.
289 (1993), available at http: /www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/nafta-alena/agree-en.asp.
177. Sempra I. supra note 5. 75 (quoting GAMI Invs., Inc. v. United Mexican States,
Proceedings pursuant to NAFTA Chapter 11 & UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules
33 (2004) (final awvard), available at http://x-w.state.gov/documents/organization/
38789.pdf.
178. See Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12 64 (2003)
(decision on jurisdiction).
179. Sempra I. supra note 5. $ 75.
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3. Minority Shareholders May Bring a Claim and ICSID May Hear the
Claim as Long as It Is Treaty Based
Past ICSID tribunals have reached the same conclusion as the Sempra
tribunal that investors may bring treaty-based claims regardless of
whether or not a parallel cause of action in contract is available else-
where.18 0 In the present, case, Argentina attempted to rely upon the dis-
tinction made by the Vivendi' 8' tribunal between claims based on
contractual breaches and those based on treaty violations, suggesting that
contract law should govern contract breaches.18 2 While such is the case
where the claim is only based on contract law,' 83 the Sempra tribunal
correctly rejected such exclusive national jurisdiction where the claim was
also based on a treaty violation. 18 4 In practice, the rule has been that "as
contractual claims. . . even if there had been or there currently was a
recourse to the local courts for breach of contract, this would not have
prevented submission of the treaty claims to arbitration.' 1 85 Several
other cases have echoed this conclusion. 186 The Sempra tribunal only
strengthened this conclusion on its facts by reference to the U.S.-Argen-
tina BIT, 187 and its "umbrella" 1 8 clause, 18 9 which creates an obligation
of the host nation to observe its contractual arrangements under the
treaty. 190 Finally, as noted above, the BIT's broad definition of invest-
ment supplies a minority investor with the right to bring a claim' 9' that
Argentina has expropriated its investment.
180. See Di Rosa, supra note 1, at 54. See also, e.g., Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3 50 (2004) (decision on jurisdiction) (finding that if a
claim is based in both contract and treaty, the fact that it may be submitted to
national courts does not prevent its submission to an ICSID tribunal).
181. See Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3 21
(2002) (decision of the ad hoc committee on the request for supplementation and
rectification of its decision concerning annulment of the award).
182. See id.
183. See, e.g., SGS Soci6t6 G6n6rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Paki-
stan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13 $3 162 (2003) (decision of the tribunal on objec-
tions to jurisdiction) (finding "that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction with respect to
claims submitted ... and based on alleged breaches of" contract).
184. See Sempra I, supra note 5, 101.
185. Enron Corp. & Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/3 50 (2004) (decision on jurisdiction) (citing CMS Gas Transmission Co.
v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8 (2003) (decision of the tribunal
on objections to jurisdiction) [hereinafter CMS Gas I]).
186. See, e.g., Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12 67-74
(2003) (decision on jurisdiction).
187. See Sempra I, supra note 5, J 101.
188. Id.
189. See U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 8, at art. II(2)(C).
190. See Sempra I, supra note 5, $ 101.
191. See discussion supra Part. IV.B. (discussing the right of a minority investor to bring
a claim before ICSID).
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VI. THE MERITS OF SEMPRA V. ARGENTINA
A. FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE TRIBUNAL
As an initial matter, the tribunal first made several factual findings: 192
(1) Sempra was guaranteed a right under its license and the regulatory
framework to tariff adjustments based on the U.S. Producer Price Index
(PPI); 193 (2) Sempra had a right to calculate its tariffs in U.S. dollars
initially before re-expressing them as Argentine pesos on customers'
bills;194 (3) the measures adopted by Argentina violated the guarantees to
stability of investment found in Clause 9.8 of Sempra's license by modify-
ing the terms of the license unilaterally; 195 (4) Sempra was due, but never
paid, reimbursement of subsidies but that reimbursement was due in Ar-
gentine pesos;196 and (5) Argentina's interference with Sempra's bill col-
lection and internal employment matters was reasonable, limited, and did
not entail demonstrable damage beyond or in addition to the effects the
general economic crisis in the nation had on Sempra's investment. 97 In
light of its findings, the tribunal considered the merits of Sempra's treaty
based claims.198
B. ARGENTINA DID NOT EXPROPRIATE SEMPRA'S INVESTMENT
Expropriation was the principle claim made by Sempra in this arbitra-
tion; the tribunal, however, found that Argentina neither directly nor in-
directly expropriated Sempra's investment.1 99 Article IV(1) of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT provides that "[i]nvestments shall not be expropriated or
nationalized either directly or indirectly through measures tantamount to
expropriation or nationalization... except for a public purpose... upon
payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation. '200 This lan-
guage clearly establishes a treaty-based right against expropriation. 20 1
192. These determinations of fact involved a fairly thorough consideration of recent
Argentine history to determine how the license and other guarantees should be
interpreted both legally and in terms of legitimate expectations, but these details
are beyond the scope of this note. Furthermore, Argentina's argument that its
measures were excused by the defense of emergency under Argentine law was
rejected by the tribunal, which stated its conclusion that liability existed under
Argentine law, international law, and specifically under the U.S.-Argentina BIT.
To the extent any inconsistency does exist, the BIT is supreme under both Argen-
tine law and international law. Sempra II, supra note 5, 238.
193. Id. $$ 110-15.
194. Id. 141.
195. Id. 91 170-74.
196. Id. 9191 82-84.
197. Id. 9191 93-94.
198. See discussion supra Part IV.A (stating Sempra's allegations were expropriation, a
denial of fair and equitable treatment, violation of the treaty's umbrella clause,
arbitrary and discriminatory treatment, and failure to give full protection and se-
curity). See also, Di Rosa, supra note 1, at 54.
199. Sempra II, supra note 5, 919 280-81, 283.
200. U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 8, art. IV(1).
201. See Di Rosa, supra note 1, at 64 (explaining that "Most BITs allow these [expropri-
ation] claims under clauses referring to measures 'equivalent to' or 'tantamount to'
expropriation").
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Further, under the Argentine Constitution, "[f]oreigners enjoy... all the
civil rights of citizens. ' 20 2 One of these civil rights granted to citizens is
the right to protection of private property against confiscation by the gov-
ernment except when "[e]xpropriation for reasons of public interest [is]
authorized by law and previously compensated. ' 20 3 Therefore, the Ar-
gentine Constitution establishes protection against expropriation for a
foreign national doing business in Argentina.20 4
1. Direct Expropriation Did Not Occur
As an initial matter, the tribunal rightfully pointed out that no direct
expropriation occurred because no "essential component of [Sempra's]
property right[s] [were] transferred to a different beneficiary, in particu-
lar the State. ' 20 5 It is well settled under international law that direct ex-
propriation is only found where there has been "open, deliberate and
acknowledged takings of property, such as outright seizure or formal or
obligatory transfer of title in favour of the host State. '20 6 Therefore, "[i]n
spite of all the difficulties which the Licensees and the investors have
experienced ... they are still the rightful owners of the companies and
their businesses,"'207 so no property was directly expropriated by
Argentina.
2. Indirect Expropriation Did Not Occur
The tribunal's determination that no indirect expropriation occurred is
also consistent with established international law. The tribunal applied
substantial deprivation of rights test.20 8 Under this test, "[s]ubstantial
deprivation results... from depriving the investor of control over the in-
vestment, managing the day-to-day operations of the company." et
cetera.20 9 While the tribunal found that the measures undertaken by Ar-
gentina had an adverse effect on the conduct of Sempra's business, 2 10
Sempra still controlled its own business despite the changed circum-
stances of its operation.
202. CONST. ARG. ch. 1, § 20.
203. Id. § 17.
204. See Christina M. Wilson, Argentina's Reparation Bonds: An Analysis of Continuing
Obligations, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J 786, 804 (stating that the Argentine constitu-
tion protects property rights to the extent it requires expropriation only for a pub-
lic purpose with prior compensation).
205. Sempra II, supra note 5, % 280.
206. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 103
(2000) (award).
207. Sempra II, supra note 5, % 281.
208. Id. 91 284. See also Metalclad, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 1 13 (utilizing the
substantial deprivation test to judge an indirect expropriation claim); CMS Gas
Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8 91 24 (2005)
(award) [hereinafter CMS Gas II].
209. Sempra II, supra note 5, 284.
210. Indeed, the tribunal found that these adverse effects were bad enough to be com-
pensable under other treaty provisions. See, e.g., id. 91 398 (requiring compensa-
tion to Sempra based on Argentina's violations of Article 112(a) and (c) of the
U.S.- Argentina BIT).
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The application of the substantial deprivation test finds support in an-
other recent decision regarding the CMS Gas Transmission Company. In
CMS Gas, CMS made essentially the same claims as Sempra did in the
present case-that Argentina's regulatory changes violated its agree-
ments with CMS by altering the tariff structure and subsequently pesify-
ing the existing tariff rates in manner that effectively destroyed the value
of CMS's investment and thus indirectly expropriated the investment.211
The tribunal found that Argentina had indeed failed to honor several le-
gitimate expectations and rights of CMS, including those relating to tariff
rates, and that these violations indeed had an important effect on the
value of CMS's investment. 212 Even so, the tribunal found that in consid-
eration of all the situational facts, these violations did not amount to indi-
rect expropriation. In particular, the CMS tribunal relied on facts similar
to the Sempra tribunal in making its determination.
As in the present case, the measures complained of in CMS were ar-
guably temporary in nature and in response to an actual economic cri-
sis. 2 13 The CMS tribunal found as a fact that more than five years had
passed since the adoption of the first measures of which CMS com-
plained 214 and the tribunal appeared to be wary of interpreting any tariff
agreement as "an insurance policy or a super-right under the License that
would ensure profits under any circumstances, irrespective of prevailing
economic conditions. ' 215 Finally, the CMS tribunal also focused on the
fact that not only did CMS retain formal ownership of its investment,
CMS also retained full and unobstructed control of such investment.216
Consequently, the CMS tribunal decided that "the Government of Ar-
gentina has not breached the standard of protection laid down in Article
IV(1) of the Treaty. '217
C. ARGENTINA VIOLATED SEMPRA'S RIGHT TO
FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT
Sempra also argued that the measures undertaken by Argentina
breached the standard of fair and equitable treatment under Article
II(2)(a) of the BIT, which reads, "Investment shall at all times be ac-
corded fair and equitable treatment... and shall in no case be accorded
treatment less than that required by international law."' 218 In an impor-
tant victory for investors, the tribunal interpreted this clause broadly to
protect "basic expectations that were taken into account by foreign inves-
211. See CMS Gas II, supra note 211.
212. See id. T 127-66. In fact, the tribunal stated that "the combined effect of tariff
freezes and devaluation, even if the latter resulted in a decrease of operating costs,
led to the evaporation of operating income, [and] prompted constant negative re-
sults in the balance sheet." Id. T 182.
213. See id. 105. See also Sempra II, supra note 5, 193.
214. See CMS Gas II, supra note 211, 9 107.
215. Id. T1 232.
216. See id. [ 263.
217. Id. [ 264.
218. Id. 91 266.
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tors to make the investment.- 219 The tribunal noted that the changes in
the tariff regime themselves were enough to transform "[a] long term
business outlook... into a day-to-day discussion about what is next to
come," and thus "substantially changed the legal and business framework
under which the investment was decided and implemented.
220
1. Meaning of Fair and Equitable
In so deciding, the tribunal recognized that BITs such as the U.S.-Ar-
gentina BIT can make international law more investor friendly. As the
tribunal hinted,221 prior to about the year 2000 there was little opinion as
to precisely what sort of protection a BIT's "fair and equitable" clause
provided.222 More recently, however, multiple tribunals interpreting va-
rious BITs have attempted clarification. 223 The Sempra tribunal essen-
tially adopted the reasoning of the Tecmed tribunal, which held that a
similar clause in the Mexico-Spain BIT "requires the Contracting Parties
to provide to international investments treatment that does not affect the
basic expectations that were taken into account by the foreign investor to
make the investment" or any understandings or agreements "that were
relied upon by the investor to assume its commitments as well as plan and
launch its commercial and business activities. '224
Given the stated objectives of the United States and Argentina in sign-
ing their BIT, to "creat[e] a more stable and predictable legal framework
for investment" so as to encourage investment, ' 225 and the objective of
Argentina's privatization plan, to attract foreign investment by changing
their law and economy,226 an interpretation that protects the legitimate
expectations of investors is the only interpretation that passes the smell
test. This interpretation is not only in line with progressive thinking on
the topic, 227 but is the right policy choice given the interconnectedness of
today's world economy.
219. Id. $ 268.
220. Sempra II, supra note 5, 303.
221. Id. 9 296.
222. Rudolf Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Key Standard in Investment Trea-
ties, 39 INT'L LAW. 87, 88 (2005).
223. See, e.g., CMS Gas II, supra note 211; T6cnicas Medioambientales, Tecmed v.
United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2 (2003) (award); Int'l
Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, NAFTA Arbitration
(Award of January 26, 2006).
224. Tecmed, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2 9 154. Article 4(1) of the Mexico-Spain
BIT is essentially the same as Article II(2)(a) of the U.S.-Argentina BIT; it reads:
"Each contracting Party will guarantee in its territory fair and equitable treatment,
according to international Law, for the investments made by investors of the other
Contracting Party."
225. U.S.-Argentina BIT, Letter of Submittal, 1991 U.S.T. LEXIS 176, at *4 (1993).
226. See Di Rosa, supra note 1, at 45-46.
227. See Sempra II, supra note 5, 302.
334 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 15
D. ARGENTINA VIOLATED THE UMBRELLA CLAUSE OF THE BIT
The tribunal held that Argentina's violations of its obligation "not to
freeze the tariffs or subject them to price controls, to compensate for any
resulting differences if such actions were in fact taken, and not to amend
the License without the licensee's consent" 228 resulted in a violation of
the Article II(2)(c) of the BIT, the Umbrella Clause, which reads: "[ejach
Party shall observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to
investments. '229 This holding was particularly important for investors in
that it assumed that "major legal and regulatory changes introduced by
the State" constitute treaty violations if such changes affect a right pro-
tected under the treaty. 230 Argentina attempted to characterize the mea-
sures it took as perhaps mere contractual violations not protected by the
treaty.231 The tribunal admitted that while the line between a treaty
breach and a contractual breach may not always be crystal clear, such
legal and regulatory changes are not ordinary contractual breaches be-
cause ordinary parties cannot commit them-only a government can.23 2
This holding protects investors by holding governments to their promises
when they agree to do what only a government can do in order to entice
foreign investors to their country.
E. ARGENTINA DID NOT TREAT SEMPRA ARBITRARILY
AND DISCRIMINATORILY
The tribunal held that Argentina did not treat Sempra arbitrarily and
discriminatorily in violation of Article II(2)(b) of the U.S.-Argentina
BIT.233 Sempra had complained that the measures Argentina took were
arbitrary because they destroyed Sempra's "rights and reasonable expec-
tations, lacked proportionality, and were in violation of the law."' 234 In
rejecting this claim, the tribunal stated that a prerequisite for a finding of
arbitrariness is that the actions complained of are shown to constitute
"impropriety. ' 235 The tribunal found that while Argentina's actions did
violate Sempra's rights, Sempra did not show that Argentina's govern-
ment only reacted to its economic crisis in a manner it genuinely believed
best.236 This appears to have been merely a problem with Sempra's proof
228. Id. $ 313.
229. U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 8, at art. II(2)(c).
230. Sempra II, supra note 5, 311.
231. Id. 1 309.
232. Id. 311.
233. Article II(2)(b) provides: "Neither Party shall in any way impair by arbitrary or
discriminatory measures the management, operation, maintenance, use, enjoy-
ment, acquisition, expansion, or disposal of investments. For the purposes of dis-
pute resolution under Articles VII and VIII, a measure may be arbitrary or
discriminatory notwithstanding the opportunity to review such measure in the
courts or administrative tribunals of a Party." U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 8,
at art. II(2)(b).
234. Sempra II, supra note 5, $ 315.
235. Id. $ 318.
236. Id.
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and does not attack the heart of the protections involved.
Sempra also argued that Argentina's measures were discriminatory in
that they imposed burdens disproportionately on the predominately for-
eign-owned gas sector.237 The tribunal found, however, that Sempra sim-
ply failed to show any one sector had been irrationally or capriciously
singled out for harsher treatment. 238 While Sempra failed to prove this
claim, protection is available for future investors under such BIT provi-
sions if a complaining investor can show that a similar primarily foreign-
owned industry was singled out capriciously.239
F. ARGENTINA DID NOT FAIL TO PROVIDE FULL PROTECTION
AND SECURITY TO SEMPRA'S INVESTMENT
Finally, the tribunal rejected Sempra's claim that Argentina failed to
provide its investment with full protection and security. Article II(2)(a)
of the U.S.-Argentina BIT reads in pertinent part that "[i]nvestments
shall at all times... enjoy full protection and security. '240 Quite summa-
rily, the tribunal rejected this claim because Sempra did not show that
Argentina failed to physically protect its employees or facilities. 241 Im-
portantly, however, the tribunal suggested that in the future it may be
possible to make this claim in regards to legal protection of an invest-
ment. 242 The tribunal pointed out that this possibility would be hard to
distinguish from a breach of fair and equitable treatment or a case of
expropriation, but such a case might be possible.243 For instance, if a gov-
ernment were to shut down the local court system so as to make it impos-
sible for a foreign investor to properly function within its expected and
unchanged regulatory environment, such a claim may start to look more
viable. Again, while of little help to Sempra itself, the discussion by the
tribunal here suggests an evolving, pro-investor interpretation of another
common BIT clause.
G. ARGENTINA'S DEFENSE OF EMERGENCY/NECESSITY
DOES NOT APPLY
The tribunal rejected Argentina's claims that it was exempt from liabil-
ity in light of a state of national emergency or necessity under its own
237. Id. 315.
238. $ 317.
239. But see LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1
[ 147-63 (2006) (decision on liability) (setting a strict separation between BIT
"fair and equitable" provisions and provisions barring discriminatory treatment to
the effect that inequitable treatment does not per se violate an anti-discrimination
protection). Under CMS, which also interpreted Article II(2)(b) of the U.S.-Ar-
gentina BIT, this provision is arguably satisfied so long as a government allows for
some process in making its decision to single out a foreign-held industry for har-
sher treatment.
240. U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 8, at art. II(2)(a).
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domestic law, general international law, and the Treaty. The precise rea-
soning of the first two arguments is beyond the scope of this note, but
essentially the tribunal rejected them because Argentina did not show
that its government was on the verge of collapse, nor that the measures
taken were in fact the only measures that were available to deal with its
economic crisis.244 These two findings were also important to the deter-
mination of Argentina's treaty-based defenses.
Finally, the tribunal also rejected Argentina's treaty based defenses.
The tribunal rejected Argentina's plea of necessity under Article IV(3) 2 4 5
of the treaty, declaring that the Article cannot "be read as a general es-
cape clause from treaty obligations. ' 246 Similar to its analysis of emer-
gency under international law discussed above, the tribunal found that
this Article deals with crises of a greater magnitude than in the present
case and thus could not serve to abrogate other treaty rights in this con-
text. Further, the tribunal also rejected Argentina's plea of necessity
under Article X1247 of the treaty for the same reason.248 Important to
this determination was a finding that the United States and Argentina did
not intend for Article XI to be a self-judging treaty provision. Instead,
they intended Article XI to be consistent with the treaty's stated objec-
tives.249 As a whole, this rejection of an emergency/necessity defense for
Argentina confirms that even amidst an admitted economic crisis the
treaty's protections do not stop protecting foreign investors.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Sempra jurisdictional decision and subsequent cases to the same
effect 250 were an important reaffirmation of the right of foreign investors
244. Id. $1 348-50.
245. Article IV(3) read: "Nationals or companies of either Party whose investments
suffer losses in the territory of the other Party owing to war or other armed con-
flict, revolution, state of national emergency, insurrection, civil disturbance or
other similar events shall be accorded treatment by such other Party no less
favorable than that accorded to its own nationals or companies or to nationals or
companies of any third country, whichever is the more favorable treatment, as
regards any measures it adopts in relation to such losses." U.S.-Argentina BIT,
supra note 8, at art. IV(3).
246. Sempra II, supra note 5, 363.
247. Article XI reads: "This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of
measures necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obli-
gations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or
security, or the Protection of its own essential security interests." U.S.-Argentina
BIT, supra note 8, at art. XI.
248. The tribunal held that Article XI is not self-judging and that requirements for ex-
emption from liability under it are the same as under customary international law.
As a consequence, because the tribunal already determined that Argentina did not
qualify for the emergency defense under customary international law, it found Ar-
ticle XI was not satisfied either. See, e.g., Sempra II, supra note 5, $$ 374, 383.
249. See discussion supra Part I.C (explaining that the intent of the BIT was to create a
more stable and predictable legal framework for investment for investors of both
nations in the other nation).
250. See, e.g., El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/
03/15 (2006) (decision on jurisdiction).
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to ICSID arbitration. By 2004, Argentina had faced adverse jurisdic-
tional decisions in six similar cases,251 and faced many more pending
claims, 252 including Sempra Energy's claim. Had the tribunals in each of
those previous decisions accepted Argentina's jurisdictional arguments,
many investors would have had little recourse but to have the companies
they control bring contract claims in local Argentine courts. This is ex-
actly what the Calvo Doctrine suggests should happen, but it is at odds
with what the U.S.-Argentina BIT was meant to protect against by means
of the ICSID tribunal arbitration system.
While the validity of an expropriation claim by Sempra is uncertain,
both Sempra and other potential claimants can still potentially utilize
other treaty protections such as a guarantee of fair and equitable treat-
ment.25 3 By allowing Sempra a chance to be heard and interpreting juris-
dictional rules in favor of arbitration, the ICSID has given investors all
over the world more confidence that they too will be protected from un-
fair treatment by host nations. In fact, in the CMS decision the ISCID
tribunal found that Argentina violated CMS's rights to fair and equitable
treatment and awarded CMS approximately $150 million.25 4 While the
Calvo system may not have breathed its last breath yet, jurisdictional de-
cisions such as Sempra ensure that international investors will have re-
course to the ICSID should a host nation treat them unfairly, and the
system is one more positive step in the process of economic globalization.
251. See Di Rosa, supra note 1, at 51.
252. See id. at note 9 and accompanying text (showing that as of the time Di Rosa
wrote, Argentina faced thirty-five outstanding ICSID claims arising from Argen-
tina's 2002 Emergency Law).
253. See discussion supra Part section I.C (discussing the protections offered by the
U.S.-Argentina BIT).
254. See The $20bn question: CMS Wins Landmark Case Against Argentine Govern-
ment, http://www.freshfields.com/news/dynamic/Pressrelease.asp?newsitem=681
(May 25, 2005).
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